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“Bullshit”, as Harry Frankfurt writes in his recent book, On Bullshit, is a
communication that pretends to be genuinely informative, but really is not.
The person who talks bullshit, Frankfurt holds, is unconcerned with whether
what he says is true, but is very concerned with how he is thought of by the
listener. In this paper, I discuss Frankfurt's theory of bullshit, making specific
reference to the requirement for deceptive intent on the part of the bullshitter,
and to whether bullshitting must involve conscious dishonesty. Some choice
examples of bullshit are nosed and the question of whether Frankfurt really
has it in for postmodernism is addressed.
Bullshit
According to the (South African) Department of Home Affairs,2
The vision of the Department of Home Affairs is rendering a world-class ser-
vice. The Department strives to become the leading state department in South
Africa in terms of service delivery. Through successful stakeholder relation-
ships, collective and collaborative solution finding, empowerment, flexibility
and creativity, the Department will transform itself from a reactive to a
proactive organisation recognised for successful service delivery and effective
and committed staff members.
The department also has a ‘mission’ and commits itself, inter alia, to
…effectively [balance] the immediate need for information to guide the man-
agement of resources with the need for long-range, strategic information.
To a recent ‘customer’ of the department at their Wynberg branch, this appears
to be empty rhetoric at best: no such striving, nor any such management nous was evi-
1 © 2007 Ben Kotzee; licensee South African Journal of Philosophy.
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro
duction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
2 See their website at http://www.home affairs.gov.za/vision_mission.asp. Information retrieved 18 Sep
tember 2006.
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dent in his dealings with the department (quite the opposite). As a communication of
the values of the department, the statement of its ‘vision’ and ‘mission’ is mangled and
inept, veering from too vague (‘proactive organisation’) to overly specific (compare
the talk of balancing the requirements for information needed on the long and short
term). But more interesting than the jargon (and partly explanatory of it), is the moti-
vation behind the department's publicising its vision and mission. Stated reasons may
include a wish to be open regarding the organisation's values, inspiring confidence in
the public, or encouraging loyalty in its employees, but that this is the real motive is
belied by the smugness of the language in which it is couched, as much as the actual
service offered by the department. Rather, propounding a ‘vision’ and ‘mission’ is a
fad indulged in by South African organisations since the early 1990s at the latest: or-
ganisations from universities and schools to state departments and private companies
plaster similar vacuous phrases – dreamed up at ‘team-building sessions’ – over walls
and websites in order to appear effective and smart, but definitely not because they re-
ally care about values. What offends about this and other forms of ‘manage-
ment-speak’ is both its emptiness and the cynicism with which it is trotted out: it is
bad organisations pretending to be good because they have to be seen to be (even
though they care little that an intelligent public and workforce sees through the trick).
Frankfurt on Bullshit
First writing on the topic in 1986, Harry Frankfurt bemoans what he sees as a signifi-
cant feature of our culture: that there is so much bullshit in it. The bullshit (in advertis-
ing, politics, the media and the academy) that he mentions is, of course, not confined
to South Africa; bullshit is found worldwide and has been around for some time. But
there is reason to worry about the volume of bullshit that is about these days, and in
the Western culture specifically: Frankfurt attributes the quantity of bullshit out there
to such cornerstones of Western democracies as the mass (and now rolling, 24-hour)
media, advertising, the party political system, and some features of contemporary aca-
demic thought. In an article first published in 1986, Frankfurt develops a theoretical
understanding of what bullshit is and attempts to provide a definition. Recently pub-
lished as a small book, On Bullshit (Frankfurt, 2005) became something of a surprise
bestseller – bullshit in public life clearly strikes a chord.
Black on bullshit
What does ‘bullshit’ mean? Rather than write about ‘bullshit’, Max Black (in an ear-
lier essay (‘The Prevalence of Humbug’) calls Frankfurt's subject ‘humbug’, although
the two authors are concerned with the same phenomenon. Synonyms for ‘bullshit’,
besides ‘humbug’, include ‘balderdash’, ‘claptrap’, ‘hokum’ and ‘imposture’.3 Black
defines ‘humbug’ as
deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying, especially by pretentious word or
deed, of somebody's own thoughts, feelings, or attitudes (Frankfurt 2005: 6).
Like Black, Frankfurt holds that bullshit involves a ‘deliberate misrepresentation’; like
lying, bullshitting amounts to someone trying to deceive another. But there are crucial
differences: bullshitting someone, while deceiving them, does not involve an outright
3 ‘Imposture’ is especially apt. It calls to mind the book called Intellectual Impostures (Sokal and
Bricmont 1998), accusing a number of postmodern philosophers of bullshitting when they write about
science. The American edition of that book was called Fashionable Nonsense, but ‘nonsense’ is differ
ent from imposture; what the difference is will become clear below.
lie… wherein lies the difference between the two, and is bullshitting better or worse
than lying?
In attempting an answer, Black distinguishes between two matters that a speaker
may mislead a listener about: the speaker may mislead the listener about his own feel-
ings or attitudes, or about what is the case in the world, and about his own feelings
and attitudes. Take the example of the murderer Smith, on trial, unrepentant and intent
on deceiving the court. Smith may admit in a mournful voice to having killed the vic-
tim, pleading for forgiveness; if his ruse is successful, he will have deceived the court
not about who committed the crime, but about his own attitudes and feelings: the court
will think that Smith is contrite, whereas he is not. Alternatively, Smith may lie to the
court (with pathos or not), saying that Jones committed the murder and thereby de-
ceive the court twice over, firstly into believing that it is Jones who committed the
murder, and secondly into believing that he (Smith) believes that it is Jones who com-
mitted the murder. If Smith is successful in this second deception, he will have de-
ceived the court both about what actually happened and about what he thinks and feels
about it.
Black holds that the primary intention in humbug is not to deceive the listener about
what is the case in the world (as in Smith's second deception), but to deceive the lis-
tener about some matter regarding himself or his own qualities. Take the case of the
social theorist who writes that
…the anthropomorphic cult, with its code of devout observances, suffers a pro-
gressive disintegration through the stress of economic exigencies and the decay
of the system of status (Black 1983: 10).
On this view, the theorist cares little about what the reader comes to believe about his
topic (the ‘leisure class’), but is rather most interested in impressing on the reader that
he really is a very brilliant and sensitive fellow.
Frankfurt on bullshit and truth
Distinguishing his account from Black’s, a great part of Frankfurt's effort is directed at
capturing the particular dishonesty involved in talking bullshit, and in saying how
bullshit differs from lying. Although Frankfurt thinks it correct that the bullshitter mis-
represents himself in the way that Black describes, he holds that it is entirely unhelpful
to say that bullshit is ‘short of lying’ or is like a lie, but not quite. He points out that
any use of language at all shares some features with lying – taken in the broadest
sense, just by virtue of being a use of language. Any assertion one makes is like a lie,
although somewhat different. Just saying that bullshit is like a lie does not go far to
describe what bullshit is.
Frankfurt points out that bullshit is often just shoddy or careless communication
(even though it is often couched in high-falutin terms). Consider this as an example of
bullshit: the student does not study for his exam, and the next day writes pages of
whatever he can remember from the course, whether relating to the question or not,
using every item of remembered or misremembered technical vocabulary. This is
called ‘bullshitting an exam’. One can also bullshit a class if one is a teacher, or a job
interview or sales presentation – in this sense, bullshit involves a scantiness of prepa-
ration coupled with a delivery confident that this deficiency will not be noticed. When
bullshitting, the content of what is said is unimportant, as long as the communication
sounds right.
S. Afr. J. Philos. 2007, 26(2) 165
166 S. Afr. J. Philos. 2007, 26(2)
Frankfurt points out, however, that bullshit is not always just careless talk. Some-
times bullshit is very carefully crafted: he notes that, in enterprises like advertising,
public relations and politics (amongst others) people take great care in ensuring that
they will mislead others about their own feelings and attitudes, without quite lying:
much thought and preparation – rather than very little – is the hallmark of this
smooth-talking bullshit. The exceptional people capable of fooling others in this way
without their noticing or caring, are called bullshit artists. Frankfurt (2005: 22) thinks
that there is some tension between the idea that bullshit is typically a shoddy or care-
less communication, but can also be something prepared with great care. He con-
cludes, though, that there is always something substandard even to such carefully
crafted bullshit, because even the bullshit artist is trying to ‘get away with something’
(or is selling the listener short) in some respect. The bullshit artist may be careful
about how he portrays himself and his message, but he is not careful about the truth of
what he says.
Bullshit and meaning
The concern with truth forms the central plank of Frankfurt's argument. It captures his
disagreement with Black and is the reason why Frankfurt's little article on bullshit
makes a not insignificant contribution to the philosophy of language: by distinguishing
bullshit from lying, it helps us understand better what goes on when someone lies and,
more importantly, by saying what good speech is not, it helps to make clear what it is
to speak at all.
At its most basic, the activity of speaking is one of sharing truths; what people do in
speaking is provide each other with handy information about where to find what they
want – food, water, shelter and the like at the most basic level – and avoid what they
fear. When we speak about engineering, computer science or economics today we are
still communicating information that is of interest to other people, although admittedly
of a type less concerned with direct, basic needs. Be that as it may, in order to be an
efficient participant in this activity of ‘speaking to each other’ one needs to speak the
truth – if you say something false (for whatever reason), you are transmitting poten-
tially damaging information to the listener. Naturally, all of us say things that are false
sometimes and mostly this is just due to honest mistake. Most people do not try (at
least most of the time) to say what is false. Of course, everyone lies at some point:
whether it be a white lie or a bare-faced lie does not matter – lying is saying something
that is untrue, knowing that it is untrue and knowing that the listener takes one to be
speaking the truth. Morally speaking, we disapprove of lying, but lying is not just
wrong for moral reasons: it is wrong for a semantic reason as well: there would be
nothing like communication of handy truths to others – there would be no speech – if
everyone lied all of the time. If everyone lied all of the time, speaking to each other
would have no point, firstly but, more strikingly, words could have no meanings at all
if they were not used to communicate truth in the first instance. If no-one ever used a
sentence like ‘the cat is on the mat’ when there is clearly a cat on the mat, that sen-
tence would not mean that the cat is on the mat. If it was consistently used to describe
another situation (say the dog standing in the door) ‘the cat is on the mat’ would mean
the dog is standing in the door; and if ‘the cat is on the mat’ were not used consistently
to describe one kind of situation at all – if it were simply voiced at random, not taking
into account what is actually going on in the world when one says it – it would simply
mean nothing. The point is that speaking is for describing situations in the world and if
one ignores how the world is in speaking, what one produces is not language, but just
noise. This insight is captured most strikingly in Davidson's (1984a) theory of ‘radical
interpretation’, and is the most compelling reason why one's theory of meaning should
be what we philosophers of language call ‘truth-conditional’.
In writing about bullshit and lying, Frankfurt relies on this insight. He notes that,
without the activity of speaking the truth, there could be no lying at all. One reason is
this: the (successful) liar is someone who knows that others will take him to be speak-
ing the truth, and derives benefit from the fact that what he says is false; he could not
derive this benefit if people did not have the expectation that what he says is true. But
the best reason for holding lying to depend on speaking the truth is the conceptual one
mentioned above: no-one could tell a lie if there were no practice of communicating
information about how the world is to each other in the first place. Lying is just assert-
ing something as true that one knows is false – to be in a position to do this there has
to exist, firstly, the custom between people of asserting and interpreting utterances as
true. Think of counterfeiting money: if there were no real money, it would be impossi-
ble to make fake or counterfeit money. Lying depends on speaking the truth in the
same way: we might say that lying is transacting in fake truth.
Seen against this background, it becomes possible to state the difference between
bullshit and lying. In lying, Frankfurt holds, the liar is engaged in the practice of tell-
ing the truth just as the speaker who is speaking the truth is. By this, he means that the
liar is transmitting to the hearer a discreet piece of information that is of interest to the
hearer and that is portrayed as true. The information the liar transmits is, of course,
false4 – the point is that it pretends to be true and that it is straightforwardly and verifi-
ably true or false. Furthermore, in saying what he says the liar is guided by the truth.
The liar could not lie if he did not have definite opinions about what is true and false,
and consciously avoided telling the truth: he cares about what is true and is guided in
what he says by what is true in as much as he avoids saying what is true (Frankfurt
2005: 56-61) In bullshitting, the situation is different. The bullshitter does not make a
straightforward communication of something that he believes is false. In reality, the
bullshitter does not care much about what he actually says – his aim is not to lead the
listener into believing something that is not true,5 but to confuse the listener into be-
lieving that he is communicating something at all, when he is doing nothing of the
sort. Whereas the liar informs the listener (but wrongly), the bullshitter fakes taking
part in the transmission of information. The liar contributes to the cooperative effort
that is communication, but he contributes something bad, while the bullshitter pretends
to contribute, but contributes nothing at all. The difference between the two, one might
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4 More accurately, the information is believed to be false by the liar.
5 Cohen (2002: 327 8) disagrees. He holds that bullshit is often designed to lead to a misapprehension
on the part of the listener. This is true especially in politics and advertising, where bullshit is exactly
used to mislead people into believing that, say, conservatism is the compassionate way or that Omo
washes whiter. In holding that some lying may also be bullshitting, Cohen misses the precise distinc
tion: advertisers may of course lie; the point is that, insofar as they are merely bullshitting, there is no
specific thing that they want to mislead the listener about. What bullshitters in advertising or politics
want is not for the public to believe something specific, but rather that they believe whatever will make
them vote for the politician or buy the company's goods. Say the politician tells the voters that Senator
John was a friend of the North Vietnamese, knowing that this is not true, and in order to make the pub
lic believe that Senator John was a friend of the North Vietnamese. This is lying. But say the same poli
tician says that Senator John ‘flip flops around on the left bank of public opinion’, meaning not for the
public to believe anything specific about Johns policy ideas, but in order to create a range of negative
impressions of John that might vary from voter to voter. In such a case the politician is bullshitting.
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say, is like that between a thief and a freeloader – the liar diminishes the stock of truth
that his listener holds, while the bullshitter as freeloader pretends to share something
with the listener, but shares nothing at all.
Frankfurt's main addition about bullshit (and also what his account offers over that
of Black) concerns the relationship between bullshitting and truth talking. The
bullshitter not only portrays himself as believing or feeling what he does not (as Black
suggests); in speaking, he also shows a disregard for what is true. This makes the
bullshitter, for Frankfurt, ‘a greater enemy of the truth than [the liar]’ (2005: 61).
‘Frankfurt-bullshitters’ and ‘Cohen-bullshit’
An interesting consequence of Frankfurt's view is that bullshit need not actually be
false: it is not the truth or falsity (or even meaninglessness) of a sentence that makes it
bullshit; it is that it is uttered without concern for what is true. Given Frankfurt's view,
it is possible to make a true utterance without concern for the truth, and still utter
bullshit. Take the example of the student bullshitting his essay: say that he, acciden-
tally – and without really caring, writes something that is true. Due to his not caring
about the truth of what he writes, this will be bullshit even though it is true.
In reality, the minds of people who bullshit may be a lot more murky than Frankfurt
suggests. Sometimes bullshitters are guided by the truth, if only after a fashion. Take
the following example: at the time of the first power cuts in the Western Cape at the
beginning of last year, minister responsible Alec Erwin suggested that the bolt found
in the Koeberg turbine shaft, which partly caused the power cuts (together with dust
and bird-doo on power lines from Mpumalanga), was placed there as an act of sabo-
tage. What was going through Erwin's mind is unclear: did he know that the act was
not sabotage, but said that it was? Then he was lying. Did he not care whether it was
sabotage or not, but just wanted to fool the public into thinking that Eskom and by ex-
tension he were really very efficient and pro-active service providers when they were
not? Then he was bullshitting. Or might he – clutching at straws – have believed that it
really was sabotage? Then, one might say that he was simply gullible. The case be-
comes more complex when Erwin later denies that he ever called the bolt in the tur-
bine ‘sabotage’, and starts to refer to the event as one of ‘human instrumentality’.
Most would agree, I think, that this was an attempt to bullshit himself out of trouble.
But does this case fit Frankfurt's analysis of bullshit? Was it said not caring about the
truth? Funnily, in this case, I think Erwin cared very much about the truth in what he
said. Inasmuch as ‘human instrumentality’ simply means ‘a person was involved in the
bolt getting there’, it is of course true that the bolts ending up there was human instru-
mentality; the bolt could not have arrived there by itself; someone left or placed it.
What was going on is this: on his second appearance about this issue, Erwin had to
speak the truth – the media would have his skin if he did not – he just tried to speak
the truth in such a way that he would emerge looking sharp, businesslike and in con-
trol; hence the phrase ‘human instrumentality’. One thinks of truths uttered in the same
way by any organisation trying to excuse itself: think of the American military's call-
ing civilian deaths ‘collateral damage’; they even refer to a bolt as a ‘hexagonal fasten-
ing device’ – both phrases being quite precise, but overblown in a very specific way.
Despite speaking the truth, what these people say is still bullshit, suggesting that
Frankfurt's account does not work as neatly as it stands.
Concerned about something like this, Cohen (2002) distinguishes between the pro-
ducer of bullshit's intention (that is bullshitting someone) – and the product that the
bullshitter produces (the bullshit that he utters). For Frankfurt, bullshit is produced
when one has a bullshitting intention, or the essence of bullshit is that behind it lies the
intention to bullshit someone. Cohen, however, holds that not all bullshit is bullshit,
because it was produced with a bullshitting intention: some of it is bullshit simply by
virtue of the features of the utterance itself, independently of the speaker's intention
(2002: 324). What makes Erwin's ‘human instrumentality’ bullshit, on Cohen's ac-
count, is not his intention in saying it; it is simply the very phrase ‘human instrumen-
tality’ itself. Likewise, I think that what irritates many people about business speak is
the very phraseology people use, as much as their intentions: ‘stakeholders’,
‘pro-active’, ‘value added’, ‘outside the box’, and so on.
Cohen himself is concerned with the bullshit that pervades academia; as an example
he mentions the writings of the Althusserian Marxists,6 but he holds that French phi-
losophy quite generally is full of bullshit (2002: 322, 333). He describes a situation
that many academics are all too familiar with: reading pages of impenetrable
jargonised text by some writer known for the complexity of his work, one sometimes
gives up on the piece, brow-beaten by the academic's style into thinking that, as one
cannot understand the deep point he is striving to make, the author must be cleverer
than oneself. Rather than being simply too deep to understand, Cohen thinks such
work is often bullshit: when one digs through the jargon to discover the heart of what
is asserted, one finds the piece either (1) makes no real sense, (2) states something
more obvious than it pretends, or (3) is a patent absurdity.
Cohen holds that Frankfurt's analysis works quite badly for this sort of bullshit, and
that there are two things wrong with it: Firstly, entirely honest people often repeat on
trust what other seemingly trustworthy people say; if these people talk bullshit, this is
liable to be repeated, but, on Frankfurt's view, according to which bullshit requires dis-
honesty, as soon as the honest person repeats it, the utterance will stop being bullshit.
Secondly, it is possible that an honest person may simply have a bullshit idea and
voice it; especially if this is repeated by others, this person may even be encouraged to
spout more similar bullshit and others may begin to produce such bullshit of their own
under the spell of the original. Because of this possible disconnect between the
shittiness of what is said and the utterer's state of mind, Cohen holds that dishonesty is
neither sufficient nor necessary for bullshit (2002: 331-2).
Cohen attempts to explain the features that an utterance must, as it were, ‘have in it-
self’ if it is to count as bullshit. In the sense that Cohen is interested in, bullshit is a
species of nonsense: specifically, he defines bullshit as ‘unclarifiable nonsense’7
(2002: 332-3). To say, as Baudrillard does, that ‘the space of the event has become a
hyperspace with multiple refractivity, and that the space of war has become defini-
tively non-Euclidean’ is so obscure that it does not really say anything: non-Euclidean
geometries, involving the possibility that there can be more than one line parallel to a
first passing through the same point (or none!), is so unlike armed conflict that one
cannot usefully compare the two, while ‘hyperspace with multiple refractivity’ just
means nothing, mathematically speaking (Sokal and Bricmont 1998: 137-8).
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7 Cohen leaves the possibility open that there can be even more sorts of bullshit, such as ‘rubbish’ (argu
ments grossly deficient in logic or in sensitivity to empirical evidence) or ‘irretrievably speculative com
ment’ (2002: 332 3).
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Believing ones own Bullshit
Cohen's dispute with Frankfurt revolves around whether bullshit should be character-
ised firstly in terms of the dishonest intent behind someone saying something, or in
terms of some features of an utterance independent of the intent with which it is ut-
tered.8 To resolve the dispute, let us consider the type of bullshit that Cohen is clearly
worried about. Take what is called ‘postmodernism’ in the humanities. While the
movement is on the wane, many analytic philosophers worry that much bullshit mas-
querades as serious academic thought in postmodernism. What has always disturbed
me about this movement (and what seems to puzzle Cohen), is the absolute earnest-
ness and preachy air with which postmodernists attempt to convince scientists and an-
alytic philosophers that the pursuit of truth in the whole of science is misguided, or
worse: politically repressive. Frankfurt, also, seems to worry about this, although he
does not mention postmodernism by name, but talks of ‘…various forms of skepticism
which deny that we can have any reliable access to an objective reality and which
therefore reject the possibility of knowing how things truly are’ (2005: 64). Following
Frankfurt then (and in order to avoid tarring all postmodernists with the same brush),
let us take as our example the sort of bullshit Cohen worries about: the popular relativ-
ism about truth, according to which no one person may claim to have found the truth,
because ‘nothing is ever really true or false anyway’. The puzzlement (and for pop
relativists, as far as Cohen is concerned, their essential honesty) lies in the fact that
many people seem to believe that there is no truth, and in exactly those terms: they re-
peat quite often enough that truth and science, quite generally, is bunk. If what they
say is indeed bullshit, as Cohen suspects, the problem is that the seriousness and
honesty with which it is said, precludes it from being called bullshit on Frankfurt's
analysis.
Quite apart from Cohen's point, we also often say of people that they believe their
own bullshit: by this, we mean that they have become so caught up by the grand but
empty things that they say, that they repeat it whenever opportunity presents, and even
attempt to act in ways bearing out this belief. Another problem for Frankfurt's account
then, is that, if bullshit involves one person attempting to deceive another, it seems dif-
ficult to explain how someone may believe his/her own bullshit, as we so often say
they do.
Which account works best for this sort of bullshit? I think Frankfurt's does. The rea-
son lies with Cohen's defining bullshit as nonsense. Nonsense, in the philosophical
sense, is a sentence that, while it may appear meaningful, is in fact not. Here is an ex-
ample: ‘green ideas sleep furiously’. While this sentence pretends to say something
about how the world is, it in fact says nothing: it is un-understandable gibberish, or
something of which we cannot say what would be the case if it were true. If this is
nonsense, the problem for Cohen is that no-one can truly believe it: as no-one can
have any idea of what it would be for green ideas to sleep furiously, no-one can genu-
inely believe that the world is like this, that green ideas sleep furiously. (If you do not
believe me, try it for yourself: try to believe that green ideas sleep furiously. If it ap-
pears that you succeed, ask yourself ‘what do I believe?’ Then compare this ‘belief’
8 In fairness to Cohen, it must be made clear that he contemplates the possibility that bullshit can be char
acterised in both these terms. Doing so, however, takes away much of the precision that Frankfurt
brings to his definition. I think that a fair question is: ‘What is bullshit really? Someone deceiving an
other, or just nonsense phraseology?’
with the belief that the cat is on the mat.) But in order to explain what he seeks to ex-
plain (essentially honest academics telling us that the space of war is non-Euclidean or
that this is the space the Gulf War took place in), Cohen has to assume that these peo-
ple actually do believe that the space of war is non-Euclidean; something they cannot
do if bullshit is nonsense. To say something honestly, one has to believe what one
says; if bullshit is pure contentless nonsense, it cannot be believed and, therefore, also
cannot be said honestly.
Another problem with Cohen's account is identified by Frankfurt: Cohen does not
define what it is for an utterance to be unclear, in fact, he refuses to do so.9 This,
Frankfurt holds, may amount to Cohen ‘…hoisting [his] account of bullshit by its own
petard…’ Not being able to define clarity, Cohen's own account is unclear, and there-
fore bullshit by its own standards (Frankfurt 2002: 341 – 2). Cohen's concern, how-
ever, is serious and definitely not bullshit – this is the sort of bullshit that I think we
should worry about, so it is a shortcoming of his theory that it is lumped in with
bullshit by its own test.
Cohen's attempt to define bullshit as ‘unclarifiable nonsense’, in summary, flounders
for two reasons: firstly nonsense is not something that anyone can honestly believe or
say and secondly nonsense is not something that Cohen has usefully defined. This
leaves only Franfurt's account as a plausible explanation of bullshit. However, the phe
nomenon that Cohen identifies (seemingly honest theorists of all sorts talking bullshit),
not to mention the possibility that someone may believe their own bullshit, still poses
problems for Frankfurt's account of bullshit. The challenges for Frankfurt's account are
(1) explaining how people may seem to talk bullshit even when entirely honest and (2)
explaining how it may sometimes seem to us that people ‘believe their own bullshit’.
Let me deal firstly with the second challenge. For Frankfurt, bullshit involves decep-
tion. Were one to believe one's own bullshit, then this would require one's deceiving
oneself, and on the face of it, it is hard to see how this may be possible. After all, de-
ception requires that the deceived will not know that he is being deceived and if de-
ceiver and deceived is the same person, this appears impossible. The barest knowledge
of practical psychology, though, tells us that people do deceive themselves, and more
often than they would admit. Prima facie, believing one's own bullshit can be ex-
plained, on Frankfurt's account, as a case of self-deception, perhaps as follows: Take
someone who bullshits people repeatedly with great success. Say the bullshitting be-
haviour becomes more or less automatic (to the point where this person repeats his
own bullshit ‘without a second thought’). Now, were the memory of the original de-
ception to begin to fade in this bullshitter's mind and were he encouraged by others to
admire what he himself has said in the past, this person becomes like someone who re-
peats the bullshit of another (and becomes less of an original bullshitter). We would
say that he has started to believe his own bullshit, but that what he believes is still
bullshit due to the fact that, when he originally said it, it was bullshit. On this view,
bullshit is something said (or believed!) by someone who does not care about the truth
of what they say, and say what they say to impress others or repeat something first
said with that intention. In either case, what is actually said may be (trivially) true or
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that it is difficult to provide a theory of nonsense or (even) memory of the failure of the verificationist
project, that, in a sense, also sought to define bullshit as nonsense. In providing an account of bullshit, it
would be better for Cohen not to hitch his (political) wagon to the ‘theory of nonsense’ train, as there is
no telling where that train might go (if anywhere).
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simply false, or it may be nonsense – which it is does not matter to whether what is
said (and possibly believed) is bullshit.
As to the first challenge, the solution might be simply to hold that one cannot
straightforwardly identify unclarifiable nonsense with bullshit and/or hold an entire
branch of academic thought to be bullshit. Take again the case of Alec Erwin's utter-
ance that he never called the accident at Koeberg sabotage, but only ever meant that it
amounted to ‘human instrumentality’. What should we say of Alec Erwin – was he
bullshitting or not? What we should answer is not quite clear. If he cared about the
truth in saying it was ‘human instrumentality’, he is at best guilty of obfuscation, or
crimes against the English language rather than dishonesty. If he said what he did not
caring about what was true, but only to make himself appear smart or get the media off
his back, he was bullshitting, but we cannot say for sure that this was the case without
more evidence. It is the same with accusing someone of lying; one has to be sure that
there was dishonest intent in the saying for it to be called bullshitting, and this can
only be deduced from circumstantial clues, like what information he was privy to or
whether he ever contradicted himself. For Cohen, anyone uttering a certain common
unclear phrase can be said quite straightforwardly to be talking bullshit, but before this
epithet is warranted on a Frankfurt reading of the phenomenon, one has to be sure that
there was dishonesty behind the saying…in a word, it is much harder to make an accu-
sation of Frankfurt bullshit stick. And I think this is the right outcome. Accusing
someone of bullshitting, on Frankfurt's account, is accusing someone of dishonesty
and, like with all accusations of dishonesty, it should not be made lightly. I think we
should reserve our use of this loaded word – it is a profanity, after all – for cases of
provable dishonesty, making Cohen's identification of more or less all fashionable
French philosophy as bullshit injudicious.
Conclusion
The way forward for bullshit research, or for those interested in the phenomenon, lies
in deciding whether bullshit involves an attempt at dishonesty on the bullshitter's part,
or whether something can be bullshit due to some autonomous feature of the utterance.
This leaves a question I am so sure of being asked that I’ll answer it now: isn’t this at-
tempt to define bullshit or the choice between bullshit-as-autonomous or bullshit-
as-deception itself an example of academic bullshit of the ‘angels on the head of a pin’
variety? The accusation is old hat. At least one commentator has held that what Frank-
furt writes is itself bullshit or a clever parody on analytic philosophy.10 In contrast,
Frankfurt and all of us interested in the phenomenon have a serious intent in writing
about bullshit: in addition to explaining why there is so much of it about, Frankfurt
aims to capture the particular form of dishonesty involved in bullshitting people and,
in so doing, provides conceptual weaponry for those who deplore bullshit: part of the
effort in defining bullshit is to convince that some communications are worthy of the
disapproval involved in calling something ‘shit’ and to show which ones they are.
Allow me an illustration of the usefulness of the concept. I have already held it fool-
ish to call all fashionable French philosophy (or all postmodernism, for that matter)
bullshit. However, having Frankfurt's concept of bullshit at our disposal, another accu-
sation is warranted: holding that there is no truth fatally blurs the lines between speak-
ing honestly, lying and talking bullshit, suggesting that postmodernists may want to be
10 See Baggini's (2005) review of On Bullshit.
far more careful in their thought about truth. This idea is already present in Frankfurt's
article. Recall that a central question for Frankfurt is that of why there is so much
bullshit in our culture. He gives two reasons, although he hints that there may be
many. Frankfurt writes that, firstly, bullshit is ‘unavoidable whenever circumstances
require someone to talk without knowing what he is talking about’ (2005: 63). Quite
clearly, this sort of situation – found often in situations where people feel they must
appear expert – will lead to people resorting to bullshit. The other reason for the pro-
liferation of bullshit in our time that Frankfurt mentions has to do with today's philo-
sophical climate. Specifically, Frankfurt blames ‘…various forms of skepticism which
deny that we can have any reliable access to an objective reality and which therefore
reject the possibility of knowing how things truly are’ (2005: 64).
Holding that skepticism about truth and objectivity will lead to much bullshit,
Frankfurt hits the mark squarely. Of course if it is part of one's world-view that one
cannot say how things truly are (or worse, if one believes that there is no ‘how things
truly are’), this will lead to a proliferation of bullshit. For if there is no fact of the mat-
ter as to how anything really is, there can also be no better or worse descriptions of
how things are, because nothing one says or thinks can reflect how things are in the
world anyway. One might go so far as to say that, on this view, there can be no genu-
ine assertion and consequently no lying at all: if we cannot think or say how things
truly are, this means that we cannot aim at reflecting the truth in what we think and say
(thinking and speaking honestly), nor could one aim to say what is not true – one
could not lie, because by assumption one cannot know what is true and false in the
first place. Due to the absence of the possibility that anyone is guided by the truth in
such a world, everything that we say or think in such a world would be bullshit by
Frankfurt's lights; there would only be fake speech and fake thought in such a world.
Of course, that there can ever only be fake speech and thought without real speech and
thought, is as impossible as that there can only be fake money or fake art. In order to
fashion a pretend anything, the real thing first has to exist, which is why the very exis-
tence of bullshit (fake assertion) all but proves that language users really are in the
business of making assertions that purport to reflect reality. But that all speech and
thought is a sort of fake is precisely what postmodern philosophy often tells us quite
explicitly, in advancing the view that no-one can ever say or think something true. In
the absence of a truth that anyone can firmly hit or miss with what they say, all that
remains is blather, or Frankfurtian bullshit.
At this point, it may well be thought that I am unfair to the postmodernist. Many ac-
ademics who like to describe themselves as postmodernists might not think that there
is no truth at all that can be reflected or not in what we say, but might instead support
some variety of alethic relativism: According to this view, there is indeed no one truth,
but rather many different truths – perhaps we each have our own individual truth or
perhaps different cultures have different truths.11 This thought is depressingly common
in today's South Africa and finds expression in a health minister insisting that a diet of
African potatoes is as effective in the treatment of AIDS as Western medicine. This,
she takes, it seems, as a priori true, because there is no one truth, but many different
truths, one per culture.
While many efforts to defend this view have been made in the last four or five de-
cades, simple alethic relativism, in its cultural and solipsistic forms, is a non-starter.
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if all that metaphysics is in need of is a bit of corrective typography.
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Firstly, saying that there are many different truths for different individuals to aim at in
speaking will not work. Most obviously, it cannot be the case that each of us aims to
believe and say something that is ‘true-for-me’, even though it is not ‘true-for-you’.
The problem with aiming at ‘truth-for-me’ is that this is a target that no-one can fail to
hit. Simply anything I believe right then is ‘true-for-me’ and this deprives calling any-
thing ‘true’ of its point. The word ‘true’, that is, only makes sense assuming that the
beliefs or assertions it applies to could have been wrong and holding that ‘true’ means
no more than ‘true-for-me’ as much as guarantees that no one can ever be wrong in
what they say. This is an application of Wittgenstein's ideas about private language:
thinking that each of us aims to believe and say what is ‘truth-for-me’ makes the game
of believing and saying things so simple to win that there is no real point playing it.
Nor does it help thinking that each culture has a culturally specific truth that it aims
for. If believing for Frenchmen is ‘aiming at truth-for-Frenchmen’ and believing for
the Indian is ‘aiming at truth-for-Indians’ and these two types of truths are radically
different, the Frenchman and Indian would not both be believing, but only in their dif-
ferent ways, then they would have completely different cognitive attitudes. Calling
what they both do believing requires that they are doing something similar when they
believe; something similar enough that is best made sense of by holding that they are
both aiming to represent the same external reality to themselves as honestly and accu-
rately as possible. When people from different cultures believe things, they are indeed
engaged in the same cognitive activity – we would not be able to make sense of people
from other cultures as thinking beings at all, if we did not see them as believers or if
we could not see them as hitting (or missing) a truth that we might take ourselves also
to hit or miss. Thus, for the Frenchman to make sense of the Indian as a thinking be-
ing, the Indian needs, in believing, to aim at the same cognitive target as the French-
man (or at least at a cognitive target that the Frenchman can understand, which
amounts to the same thing) and vice versa. The point is that, rather than being very dif-
ferent, cultures must at least be similar enough so that we can call the members of
those cultures all believers. This requires enough of an overlap between what they all
actually believe that we can no longer talk usefully of ‘truth-for-a-culture’. (This is an
application of what Davidson (1984b) holds about the possibility of people with radi-
cally different conceptual schemes.)
Alethic relativism cannot provide postmodernism with a viable account of truth.
However, an account of truth is exactly what the postmodernism needs if it is going to
be able to draw a distinction between speaking honestly, lying and talking bullshit.
And this distinction must be drawn: presumably, the postmodernist is as interested in
being able to say of himself, or of other academics, that (s)he advanced a certain posi-
tion honestly and one can only say that one did this by saying ‘I said what I did, genu-
inely believing that it is true’. The idea of honesty, in as well as outside of academia,
requires mention of aiming at the truth in what one says. Cohen holds that, if bullshit
involves ‘expressly disparaging truth’, postmodernism is ‘bullshit risen to conscious-
ness of itself’ (2002: 333). That is nicely put, even though I have to disagree. What
postmodernism asserts about truth – that there is none – is not bullshit; it is false and
gives rise to much bullshit by undermining the very idea that anyone may speak hon-
estly. Anyone can see this by taking what I shall call the ‘bullshit’ challenge to
postmodernism: ‘Explain how it is not a consequence of your view on truth that all
that everyone – including you – ever says is bullshit, reducing your position to absur-
dity. If you are happy to believe that everyone bullshits all the time and has always
done so, explain further how there may exist what we call communication or how we
may say that others genuinely believe something definite. Take as long as you like, but
be very clear.’
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